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Introduction 
 In recent times, the profitability and viability of regional rural banks (RRBs) in India has come to 
occupy the attention of regulators and policymakers alike. Recent evidence in this context (Bhatt and 
Thorat, 2001) points to the fact that several constraints, both at the institutional level (inappropriate 
implementation of policy programs, governance structures etc) as well as at the field level (inadequate 
infrastructure, staff motivation, etc) have acted as severe impediments on the financial performance of 
RRBs. Such evidence would suggest to the possibility that there is a need to enhance the viability of RRBs. 
This is an implicit pointer to the existence of excess capacity in rural banking markets. 
The present chapter focuses on regional rural banks because, if excess capacity exists in banking, 
it is in this setting where it is likely to be most prominently manifested. If the demand for traditional 
banking activities declines, larger commercial banks are likely to have greater flexibility to scale back 
their operations and diversify their activities than RRBs with few offices and limited option to rationalise 
branches. These banks, owing to their niche markets and lack of sophisticated banking practices, are 
likely to have limited flexibility in scaling back operations in case of a decline in the demand for loans.  
The study develops indicators of potential excess capacity in the RRB segment and illustrates its 
application to individual banking firms. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following 
section discusses the microeconomic foundations of the indicators and provides an overview of the 
admittedly limited literature in this area. This is followed by a discussion of the RRBs in the Indian 
context. The methodology and the data are subsequently followed by a simultaneous equation model to 
test various hypotheses about excess capacity in RRBs. The policy implications arising out of the analysis 
are contained in the penultimate Section. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Excess Capacity in Economic Theory 
 There are several definitions of excess capacity that exist in the literature. Gorton and Rosen 
(1992) define excess capacity as a situation in which the expected return on non-bank investment exceeds 
the expected return on investment in banking. The approach adopted by the Federal Reserve of New 
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York (1993) is to apply microeconomic theory. In such a framework, excess capacity is defined as a 
situation in which a substantial portion of an industry is operating at levels below minimum short-run 
average cost. In Figure 1, if the demand curve lies in region A and the typical firm in the industry 
maximises profits by equating marginal revenue with marginal cost, the firm will produce output Q*, 
which is less than full-capacity output, QM. Thus, the firm operates with excess capacity and has higher 
per unit short-term and long-term cost than the minimum.1  
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of Excess Capacity 
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Excess capacity may exist for several reasons: (a) interest rate deregulation renders large branch 
systems less necessary as a means of competing for deposits; (b) historical restrictions on branching 
produced many more banks than would otherwise exist; (c) the household sector’s demand for bank 
deposits has declined because of attractive interest on non-bank sources; and (d) there has been a 
growing presence of foreign and new private banks in the urban areas and co-operative banks in the rural 
areas. 
As early as 1993, for the US it was observed that the share of commercial bank loans in total 
borrowing by US non-financial business was witnessing a declining trend (Greenspan, 1993). Boyd and 
Gertler (1994), for instance, reported that the share of commercial bank assets in total financial assets in 
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the US declined from a peak of approximately 48 per cent in 1994 to around 35 per cent in 1992. The 
evidence finds support in the work of Gorton and Rosen (1995) and more recently, in the findings of 
Clark and Siems (2002), wherein it is observed that the share of commercial banks in total U.S financial 
intermediation has declined from 35 per cent in the early 1990s to 20 per cent in 2000, with a concomitant 
fall in the number of banks from over 14,000 to just over 8,000 over the same period. The select studies on 
excess capacity in banking are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Studies on Excess Capacity in Banking 
Author/Year Country/Period Issue 
Radecki (1993) US banks  
1986-1992 
Causes of excess capacity in US banks 
Frydl (1993) US banks  
1976-92 
Excess capacity in US banking 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(1993) 
US banks Survey of excess capacity in financial 
sector 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) US banks 
1984-1992 
Declining investment opportunities and 
excess capacity in banking 
 
3.  Regional Rural Banks in India 
Regional Rural Banks were established way back in 1975 and were incorporated under the RRB 
Act, 1975. Originally established to drive the moneylender ‘out of business’ and bridge the capital gap 
supposedly unfilled by the rural co-operative and commercial banks, these banking institutions have 
expanded remarkably during the last decade (Table 2). Illustratively, in 1991, there were 196 RRBs with 
over 14,000 branches in 375 districts nationwide, with an average coverage of three villages per branch. 
The banks had disbursed over Rs.35,000 million in credit and mobilised over Rs.41,000 million in 
deposits. Over the period ending March 2001, the amount of advances granted increased five-fold, while 
deposits rose around ten-fold, leading to a gradual lowering of the credit-deposit ratio.2  
Table 2: Expansion of RRB System: 1991-2001 
Period  
(end-March) 
Number of 
banks 
Number of 
branches 
Credit Deposit Credit/ 
Deposit 
   (Amount in Rs. million) (Per cent) 
1991 196 14,443 35,540 41,510 86 
1995 196 14,509 62,910 111,500 56 
1998 196 14,508 84,870 193,260 44 
2000 196 14,644 126,630 300,510 41 
2001 196 14,694 150,500 382,940 39 
 
 
Despite this impressive geographic coverage and intermediation activity, the RRBs suffered from 
poor financial health, especially because of mounting loan losses and low capital base. As of June 1993, 
172 RRBs were unprofitable, with non-performing loans being well over 40 per cent. By 1998, the number 
of loss-making RRBs was reduced to 68, with non-performing loans reduced to 33 per cent. There was a 
further reduction in loss-making RRBs to 26 by 2000-01, with non-performing assets comprising 19 per 
cent of total loans. Despite this improvement, loan losses have remained high, underscoring the need for 
fundamental changes in the way RRBs conducted business. 
In essence, RRBs are commercial banks in nature and are included under the Second Schedule to 
the RBI Act, 1934. Their branches are licensed by RBI under Section 23 of the Banking Regulation Act, 
1949. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) inspects them under Section 
35 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 having concurrent powers with RBI.3 RRBs were originally 
established as a hybrid structure with the objective of combining the local feel of the co-operative and the 
business acumen of commercial banks to exclusively cater to the credit needs of rural poor.4 As at end-
March 2001, there were 196 RRBs functioning in 26 states covering 484 districts in the country with a 
network of 14,694 branches. 
With a view to strengthening the capital base and improving the financial performance of RRBs, 
recapitalisation measures were initiated in 1994-95. Until March 2000, an amount of Rs.21,880 million has 
been provided to 187 RRBs towards cleansing their balance sheets. With this, 158 RRBs stand fully 
recapitalised, 29 RRBs partially recapitalised and 7 RRBs are still to be taken up for recapitalisation, while 
2 RRBs did not require such recapitalisation. No subsequent capitalisation of RRBs has been effected since 
then. 
Apart from recapitalisation, the fragile state of RRBs necessitated initiation of several policy 
changes by the Government in the recent past. These measures included: 
o Greater emphasis on financing non-target groups, 
o Broad basing and diversification of activities, 
o Introduction of prudential norms, 
o Complete deregulation of interest rate structure, 
o Rationalisation of branch network and relocation of loss making branches, and 
o Relieving 69 RRBs of their service area obligation and allowing them to finance throughout the 
area within their jurisdiction. 
These measures provided the necessary impetus to RRBs to turn around and the financial results 
as on March 31, 2000 revealed that RRBs are on the path of recovery. The number of profit making RRBs 
and the quantum of their profit increased manifold from Rs.700 million in 1996-97 to 164 and Rs.6000 
million in 2000-01. Similarly, the number of loss making RRBs and amount of losses have come down 
from 152 and Rs.8790 million in 1996-97 to Rs.1100 million in 1999-2000. The accumulated losses of RRBs 
have reduced from a peak level ofRs.31160 million in March 1998 to Rs.29860 million in March 2000. 
While commercial bank profitability has increased since the inception of reforms, the same 
cannot be unequivocally stated about the rural banking segment. In fact, the profits of RRBs witnessed 
sharp fluctuations. Illustratively, over the period 1991 to 2001, the profits of RRBs fluctuated widely from 
a very low level to a negative in 1995-96, which turned positive in 2000-01. The number of profit-making 
RRBs also increased markedly over the period (Table 3). 
Table 3: Profitability of Regional Rural Banks – 1991 to 2001 
Year/Variable 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 
Income 7040 14910 48590 
Expenditure 6850 19170 42590 
Operating Profits -- 2710 7300 
Net Profits 190 -4250 6000 
Total Asset 71670 187190 496410 
Number of Reporting RRBs 196 196 196 
Number of Profit-making RRBs 9 12 170 
 Figures in Rs. million 
      
Several committees including Khusro Committee (1989) and the Narasimham Committee (1991) 
had gone into the question of restructuring the RRBs and several suggestions have emanated including 
merger of the RRBs. More recently, with a view to examining the various aspects of functioning of RRBs 
and making recommendations so as to enable these banks to take care of the financial needs of the rural 
populace, the Government set up a Working Group chaired by a reputed expert in the field to suggest 
amendments in the RRB Act, 1976 (NABARD, 2003). The Working Group made several 
recommendations, including, inter alia, widening the scope of financial services to be provided by RRBs, 
differentiated ownership structure based on financial health of RRBs, prescribed minimum level of 
shareholding, extension of area of operations of RRBs to encompass all districts, aligning the regulatory 
framework for RRBs on the lines of those for commercial banks with provision for such bank-specific 
relaxations as may be necessary for specific time period and adaptation of various IT-based innovations 
by RRBs at different stages of their development for providing competitive customer services in a cost-
effective manner. The Report is since under consideration of the Government. While such discussions are 
underway, an important concern that might have been overlooked is the existence of excess capacity in 
RRBs. Economically, in the face of severe competition in the financial marketplace, it might well happen 
that the demand for loans of RRBs has been declining. Along with limited opportunities for 
diversification of business, this may have lowered their profitability levels, further weakening their 
capital position and leading to a vicious circle of excess capacity in these banks. Examination of this issue 
is the major concern of the chapter.  
  
 
 
 
 
4.  Methodology and Data 
 
4.1 Indicators of Excess Capacity 
 Given the complexities in identifying excess capacity, the literature considers both necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Consistent with the theoretical discussion above, excess capacity is defined as a 
situation in which an individual bank meets all three of the following conditions: (a) persistent below-
average loan demand, measured as the ratio of loans to total assets (b) persistent below-average 
profitability, (c) persistent above-average per unit cost. These conditions, taken together, would be 
sufficient to establish the existence of excess capacity. A necessary, but not sufficient condition exists 
when a majority of the indicators exhibit some evidence of excess capacity. In order to evaluate 
‘persistence’, a period of eleven years starting from 1991 and extending upto 2001 has been employed. 
Frydl (1993) estimates the extent of excess capacity in the banking system by examining the 
number of banks that failed to earn a return on equity capital to the one-year Treasury bill rate for each of 
the years 1976-82. However, the study did not consider a homogeneous set of banks for each of the years, 
which would have provided consistent inference regarding the existence of excess capacity. The approach 
also fails to consider the cyclical nature of bank profits. For example, the study observes a decline in the 
amount of excess capacity from 1990 to 1992. While this decline might be attributable to the fall in interest 
rates and the resultant rise in profits, it does not totally ‘internalise’ the cyclical factors, owing to the short 
time span of the study.  
 
4.2 The Data 
 For the purpose of the study, we have chosen all the 196 RRBs operating in India over the period 
1991 through 2001. The data has been culled out from the Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India  and 
the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy. As the aforesaid discussion reveals, this period spans a cycle 
of extremely low (e.g., 1995-96) and moderately high (e.g., 2000-01) profitability, with intermediate levels 
of profitability in certain other years. These banks are spread across 26 states of the country. The 
summary feature of the data over the sample period is described in Table 4. 
Table 4: Summary Values of the Variables – 1991 to 2001 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum  
Size 4.269 1.054 0.157 7.124 
Return on Asset -1.947 3.728 -36.750 5.744 
Asset composition 37.132 14.230 0.659 79.119 
Liability Composition  36.819 12.598 0.000 58.598 
  
 Table 4 reveals that the average size of the RRBs was 4.27, with low levels of profitability. The 
asset composition (loan to total asset ratio) of RRBs reveals that, on average, around 37 per cent of asset 
were in loans, with high variability. Similar trend was evidenced in case of liability composition (proxied 
by time deposit to total liabilities). The RRBs are spread across 26 states, comprising all the regions of the 
country, with preponderance in the Northern region (27.6 per cent) and to a lesser extent in the Eastern 
(20.4 per cent) and Southern (17.3 per cent) regions, and among states, in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan. These four states accounted for over 50 per cent of the total RRBs 
in the country (Table 5). Owing to the creation of certain new states recently, the number of RRBs in states 
like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have since gone to these newly created states (like Uttaranchal and 
Chhattisgarh). 
Table 5: Distribution of RRBs across States – 1991 to 2001 
 Number of 
RRBs 
Percent to  
total 
Northern Region 54 27.6 
Haryana 4 2.0 
Himachal Pradesh 2 1.0 
Jammu and Kashmir 3 1.5 
Uttar Pradesh 36 18.4 
Uttaranchal 4 2.0 
Punjab 5 2.6 
North-Eastern Region 11 5.6 
Arunachal Pradesh 1 0.5 
Assam 5 2.6 
Manipur 1 0.5 
Meghalaya 1 0.5 
Mizoram 1 0.5 
Nagaland 1 0.5 
Tripura 1 0.5 
Central Region 24 12.2 
Chhattisgarh 5 2.6 
Madhya Pradesh 19 9.6 
Western Region 33 16.8 
Gujarat 9 4.6 
Maharashtra 10 5.1 
Rajasthan 14 7.1 
Southern Region 34 17.3 
Andhra Pradesh 16 8.2 
Karnataka 13 6.6 
Kerala  2 1.0 
Tamil Nadu 3 1.5 
Eastern Region 40 20.4 
Bihar 16 8.2 
Jharkhand 6 3.1 
Orissa 9 4.6 
West Bengal 9 4.6 
   
 
5. Simultaneous Equation Model and Hypotheses Tests 
5.1 Simultaneous Equation Analysis 
 The important aspect of the study is to empirically address (a) the factors affecting the financial 
performance of RRBs, and, (b) the interrelationships among the three excess capacity indicators, in a 
multivariate context. 
 Lindley et al.(1992) point out that since financial performance is determined by decisions made 
with respect to both sides of the balance sheet, simultaneous equation techniques are most appropriate to 
evaluate such performance. Keeping this in view, the following four-equation, simultaneous model is 
specified: 
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where, RoA=Return on Asset, ASSTCOM=asset composition, LIABCOM=liability composition, 
CALL=end of period call money rate, EXPN=ratio of operating expense to total asset, SIZE=natural 
logarithm of total assets, LOCATION=dummy for the state in which the RRB is incorporated, 
POPGR=population growth, TREND=time trend and GDPGR=real GDP growth. 
In the aforesaid specification, we have four endogenous variables pertaining to profitability, 
expenditure pattern, asset and liability composition. The model is closed by including exogenous 
variables that have the power to explain some/all of these variables. 
Three of the four endogenous variables (RoA, EXPN and ASSTCOM) are the excess capacity 
indicators discussed above. Economic theory suggests these variables as potential indicators of excess 
capacity. The fourth endogenous variable-liability composition-completes the system. 
Return on Asset (RoA) is the measure of profitability. EXPN is the ratio of operating expense 
(comprising of wage and other related expenses) to total assets and measures the efficiency of bank 
performance. A high value of this variable indicates lower efficiency. ASSTCOM is the ratio of total loans 
to total assets. LIABCOM is the ratio of time deposits to total liabilities. This variable measures the extent 
to which banks use traditional retail deposits, which carry lower interest than purchased funds. Keeping 
in view the possible differential reaction of large and small banks in this category, we include a control 
for SIZE. LOCATION is a dummy variable for the state in which the RRBs is incorporated. Given that the 
RRBs are spread over 26 states, for identification purposes, the dummy variable for one state (i.e., Uttar 
Pradesh) was excluded, so that the estimated coefficients measure the excess capacity in the remaining 
states relative to the omitted state. Finally, GDPGR is included to control for the economic environment.  
The model includes several exogenous variables: an interest rate variable (CALL), one-firm-
specific variable (SIZE), a demographic variable (POPGR), a dummy variable for the state in which the 
bank is incorporated (LOCATION), real GDP growth (GDPGR) to control for the economic environment 
and a trend variable (TREND) to measure the effect of technical change (Hunter and Timme, 1991).  
 5.2 Hypotheses 
 As explained earlier, there are three indicators of excess capacity in banking: (a) low profitability, 
(b) low loan demand and (c) high expense ratio. All these criteria are, of course, inter-related. The 
hypotheses explore the various relationships between the indicators and also explore the question as to 
whether they are valid indicators. Specifically, the hypotheses are that, ceteris paribus:  
Profitability is inversely related to expense ratio. Without this relationship, one of the key links 
between the three excess capacity indicators will not be present. In theory, if a bank is operating on the 
downward sloping portion of the average cost curve, it exhibits excess capacity. The resultant high 
expense ratio should result in lower profitability. 
Profitability is positively related to asset composition. The fact that rates on loans are higher than rates 
on securities (the other major asset of banks apart from loans) leads to this expectation. This hypothesis 
helps to determine if low loan demand is a useful indicator of excess capacity. 
Total expense is inversely related to total asset. This hypothesis attempts to test for scale economies. 
Profitability is positively related to liability composition. This relationship follows from the fact that 
core deposits are cheaper than other liabilities. Rural banks generally operate with low levels of 
purchased funds and high levels of core deposits. The banks that have particularly high levels of core 
deposits should be more profitable than others because core deposits carry lower interest rates than 
competing money market liabilities.5  
The expense ratio should be inversely related to the trend variable. If banks are utilising new technology 
and benefiting from it, the expense ratio should decline over time. 
 
6. Econometric Methodology 
The simultaneous equation system is estimated by three-stage least squares (3SLS) procedure. 
The 3SLS is, in essence, a full information technique, which estimates all the parameters of the structural 
model simultaneously. The first stage of 3SLS estimates all reduced-form coefficients using the least 
squares estimator, while the second stage estimates all structural coefficients by applying two stage least 
squares (2SLS) to each of the structural equations. The third stage of the process involves the generalised 
least squares estimation of all the structural coefficients of the system, using a covariance matrix for the 
disturbance terms of the structural equation that is estimated from the second stage residuals. In terms of 
the properties of estimators, the 3SLS can be shown to be asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS, 
because it takes into account cross-equation correlations. Thus, the basic rationale for 3SLS, as opposed to 
2SLS, is its use of information on the correlation of the disturbance terms of the structural equation in 
order to improve asymptotic efficiency. 
 7. Results and Discussion 
 The equation system is fitted using the 3SLS procedure. The results of the estimation process are 
contained in Table 6. 
Table 6: 3SLS Results of Excess Capacity in Regional Rural Banks 
Variable RoA EXPN  ASSTCOM LIABCOM 
Intercept 79.605 (1.18) -447.145 (-1.95)** 19.525 (18.37)* 32.388 (17.45)* 
EXPN 1.961 (0.60) --- --- --- 
LIABCOM -0.599 (-1.36) 15.172 (1.75)*** --- --- 
ASSTCOM -1.15 (-1.51) --- --- --- 
CALL 0.201 (1.61)*** 2.649 (1.85)** 1.098 (19.69)* -0.687 (-11.22)* 
TREND --- -26.683 (-2.19)* --- --- 
SIZE -7.169 (-0.68) 18.007 (0.06) --- 2.014 (7.53)* 
POPGR --- -4.249 (0.05) 0.991 (3.17)* 0.071 (0.232) 
GDPGR 2.019 (0.21) 1.326 (0.23) 0.878 (0.36) 0.643 (0.21) 
Andhra Pradesh 22.488 (1.57) 64.670 (0.05) -17.354 (-5.18)* 3.698 (3.95)* 
Arunachal Pradesh -11.545 (-1.31) -18.897 (-0.52) -10.339 (-4.59)* 0.857 (0.25) 
Assam -10.985 (-1.39) -92.396 (1.84)** -11.191 (3.26)** -4.212 (-3.01)* 
Bihar -5.292 (-1.41) 26.782 (0.05) 6.1151 (5.09)* 4.159 (4.44)* 
Chhattisgarh -11.665 (-1.56) 10.656 (0.05) -5.595 (-3.90)* 1.827 (0.55) 
Gujarat 7.796 (1.48) -1.991 (-0.03) -7.278 (-2.17)** 6.874 (5.77)* 
Haryana 19.888 (1.50) -59.442 (-0.15) 15.978 (16.81)* 14.637 (8.47)* 
Himachal Pradesh -0.536 (-0.10) -14.782 (-0.09) -2.639 (-1.33) 18.069 (4.68)* 
Jammu and Kashmir -16.887 (-.64)*** 171.547 (0.05) -10.313 (-3.08)* 1.965 (1.01) 
Jharkhand -7.881 (-1.64)*** 192.901 (0.05) -3.714 (-1.11) 0.316 (0.22) 
Karnataka 21.528 (1.66)*** -385.379 (-0.09) 16.989 (5.07)* 3.398 (2.88)* 
Kerala  30.608 (1.79)*** -110.394 (1.79)*** 0.323 (0.27) -6.501 (-2.74)* 
Madhya Pradesh 2.980 (0.87) -228.629 (-0.07) 7.741 (4.49)* 7.248 (8.60)* 
Maharashtra 0.941 (0.53) 52.101 (0.07) 35.415 (14.80)* -4.156 (-2.93)* 
Manipur -22.169 (-1.43) -176.726 (-1.65)*** 0.737 (0.80) -7.441 (-2.23)** 
Meghalaya -17.278 (-1.34) 184.998 (0.05) -3.257 (-0.97) -3.484 (-1.05) 
Mizoram -12.955 (-1.27) -26.060 (-1.66)*** -13.269 (-6.73)* -9.238 (-2.79)* 
Nagaland -34.520 (1.15) -79.945 (-0.80) 3.465 (2.22)** -1.649 (-0.48) 
Orissa 3.455 (0.82) -77.441 (-0.09) 3.876 (3.23)* -2.200 (-1.86)*** 
Punjab 10.640 (1.57) -266.747 (-1.93)** -10.754 (-4.49)* 6.459 (4.21)* 
Rajasthan 6.088 (1.09) -87.967 (-0.07) 1.782 (2.11)* 12.514 (12.67)* 
TamilNad 22.654 (1.76)*** 88.196 (0.05) 11.111 (9.26)* 1.655 (0.85) 
Tripura 26.059 (1.19) -59.495 (-0.08) -4.384 (-4.61)* 23.341 (7.07)* 
Uttaranchal -1.989  (-0.66) 69.069 (0.04) 6.807 (-2.03)** 3.010 (1.55) 
West Bengal 2.997 (0.77) -41.949 (-0.09) 18.554 (15.47)* 6.153 (5.19)* 
Number of 
observations 
2156 2156 2156 2156 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.34 
 t-ratios in brackets; *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
As observed from the table, the first hypothesis is not borne out by evidence since the coefficient 
on the expense ratio is positive (and not significant) in the RoA equation. This is in contrast to the 
evidence obtaining for US rural banks, which indicates a negative and significant relationship between 
expense ratio and profitability (Wall, 1989; Humphrey, 1987).  
The second hypothesis, profitability is positively related to asset composition (as measured by 
loan demand) does not find support from the data. Clearly, although the sign on asset composition in the 
profitability equation is positive, it is not significant at conventional levels.  
The third hypothesis, total expense is inversely related to asset size, is not borne out by the 
evidence as well. In fact, it is observed that total expense is positively related to size, suggesting lack of 
scale economies.6 
The fourth hypothesis, profitability is positively related to liability composition (as measured by 
the ratio of time deposits to total liabilities) is also not supported by analysis. In fact, the negative sign on 
liability composition in the profitability equation would suggest that banks with high levels of core 
deposits are not necessarily more profitable than others and these banks need to pay higher rates to 
attract core deposits. 
The final hypothesis, the expense ratio is inversely related to the trend variable finds support in 
the data. This is suggestive of the fact that these banks are benefiting from new technology and 
consequently, witnessing a lowering of their expense ratio. 
We also examined whether any of the dependent variables was different across states.  
The findings suggests that: 
(a) profitability of RRBs was, on average, higher in the Southern region (Karnakata, Kerala and 
TamilNad), 
(b) the expense ratio of RRBs was lower in certain Southern states (e.g., Kerala), Northern (e.g., 
Punjab) and particularly in several North-Eastern states (e.g., Assam,  Manipur and Mizoram), owing to 
the lower wage costs.7  
(c) relative to Uttar Pradesh, the asset composition of most states was more skewed in favour of 
loans, major exceptions being primarily states in North-Eastern region (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, 
Mizoram, Tripura and Nagaland), and finally, 
(d) the ratio of core deposits to total liabilities was higher vis-à-vis the benchmark for most states, 
with certain exceptions in the North-Eastern (Assam, Manipur, Mizoram), Eastern (West Bengal), 
Western (Maharashtra) and Southern (Kerala) regions. This would indicate that in these states, competing 
avenues for fund deployment by depositors are sufficiently well-developed, suggesting a low ratio of 
time deposits to liabilities. 
We present the alternate estimates with Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates. Maddala (1977) 
indicates that OLS is more robust against specification errors and that the predictions from OLS equations 
often compare favourably with those from simultaneous equation models and suggests that it is useful to 
report OLS estimates along with those from other methods. For this reason, Table 7 reports the OLS 
estimates. Since the primary purpose is to ascertain whether there exists excess capacity in RRBs, the 
location dummies have not been reported in the analysis. 
Table 7: OLS Results of Excess Capacity in Regional Rural Banks 
Variable RoA EXPN  ASSTCOM LIABCOM 
Intercept -9.130 (-1.46)* -8.252 (-20.96)* 15.525 (17.85)* 32.308 (14.38)* 
EXPN -0.481 (-10.65) -- -- -- 
LIABCOM -0.085 (-6.72) 0.007 (1.79)** -- -- 
ASSTCOM -0.008 (-1.28) -- -- -- 
CALL -0.008 (-0.44) 0.012 (1.27)** 1.109 (19.69)* -0.607 (-12.89)* 
TREND --           -0.232 (-12.09)* -- -- 
SIZE 2.914 (18.83) 2.948 (35.87)* -- 2.011 (5.21)* 
POPGR -- 0.106 (2.24)** 0.980 (3.46)* 0.071 (0.25) 
GDPGR 2.132 (0.20) 1.422 (0.21) 0.786 (0.34) 0.589 (0.20) 
LOCATION 
DUMMY 
Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.27 
t-values in brackets 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. 
 
As table 17.7 indicates, the OLS results support two of the five hypotheses. Specifically, (a) there 
is an association between higher profitability and lower expense ratio and (b) the expense ratio declines 
as time variable increases, indicating that this group of RRBs does benefit from technical change. The 
other three hypotheses are not supported by evidence. These results are generally in conformity with the 
3SLS estimates, except for the inverse relation between expense and technical change variable and 
broadly confirm the relationships among the excess capacity indicators. 
 
8. Policy Implications 
 The foregoing analysis highlights certain policy implications of the study. First, it seems that the 
wage costs of RRBs in certain states is comparatively higher. This would suggest that RRBs with high 
wage costs could institute regimes that reward staff members for better performance in assessing, 
extending and collecting loan and in promoting and servicing savings. Tying employee bonuses to 
quantifiable performance criteria are often found to be successful in increasing accountability and 
motivating staff. 
 A big problem with the RRBs is the high delinquency of loans. Available data on the aggregate 
level of non-performing loans for RRBs suggests that the default rates on loans were extremely high, with 
non-performing loans to total loans well over 20 per cent in 2000. This would suggest the need to 
introduce a standardised structure of loan repayments to achieve financial discipline. One possibility in 
this context is to introduce loan repayment incentives: borrowers who have been making timely 
repayments gradually increased the amount of credit they were eligible to receive. This can be coupled 
with routine meetings with borrowers in which social pressure could be applied to achieve prompt 
repayments. Such meetings could highlight the defaulting borrowers, which would also be an occasion 
for loss of social standing. 
 Third, the analysis would suggest limited opportunities for lending for certain states, particularly 
in the North-Eastern region. This would suggest the need for diversification of business products as a 
prime need in these rural banking institutions. The diversified avenues may include, inter alia, housing 
loans, consumer loans, consortium financing, financing of services sector, distribution of insurance 
products, etc. This would necessitate that banks not only upgrade their skills, but also invest in 
information technology in order to build up an improved Management Information System in order to 
provide efficient and affordable service.   
  Finally, the cost of credit is an important factor affecting the absorption of credit as also the 
delinquency rate. The recent Report of the Advisory Committee on Flow of Credit to Agriculture has 
observed that cost of funds for RRBs is somewhat higher than that of commercial banks as RRBs in the 
past had accepted long-term deposits by offering higher rats of interest, which provides limited 
maneuverability to reduce their lending rates. It is therefore imperative for RRBs to reduce their lending 
rates if they are to successfully compete with their commercial banking counterparts.  
 
9. Concluding Observations 
The present chapter develops a methodology for identifying excess capacity at RRBs in India 
based directly on microeconomic foundations. It is suggested that, if excess capacity exists, it is more 
likely to have an adverse impact on financial performance at RRBs. Towards this end, the entire sample of 
RRBs were selected, encompassing a sufficiently long time period spanning from 1991 through 2001 to 
test the ‘persistence’ of excess capacity, if any, in these banks. The results indicate that there does not exist 
any conclusive evidence to support excess capacity in RRBs. In particular, both the 3SLS estimates as well 
as the OLS estimates support a lowering of expense ratio over time, indicating the positive externalities 
wrought in by technical change. Most other indicators of excess capacity are not supported by the data.  
While rural banking markets are frequently characterized as ‘monopolistic’ or ‘oligopolistic’, it 
appears that, in the study, the excess capacity effect is not persistent in the Indian scenario. However, 
there seems evidence to support the fact that the expense ratio of RRBs was lower in certain states owing 
to the lower wage costs. 
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